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Chapter 10
FACTORS AFFECTING ONE-WAY
HASHING OF CD-R MEDIA
Christopher Marberry and Philip Craiger
Abstract While conducting a validation study of proficiency test media we found
that applying the same hash algorithm against a single CD using dif-
ferent forensic applications resulted in diﬀerent hash values. We formu-
lated a series of experiments to determine the cause of the anomalous
hash values. Our results suggest that certain write options cause foren-
sic applications to report diﬀerent hash values. We examine the possible
consequences of these anomalies in legal proceedings and provide best
practices for the use of hashing procedures.
Keywords: Cryptographic hash functions, one-way hashing, CD-R media
1. Introduction
Digital forensics professionals frequently use hash algorithms such as
MD5 [7] and SHA-1 [4] in their work. For example, they may identify
notable files (e.g., malware or child pornography) on media by compar-
ing their known hash values with the hash values of files that exist on the
media. Examiners also use hash values to identify and exclude common
files, e.g., system files and utilities, thereby reducing the search space in
investigations of digital media. But the most important use of hashing
is the verification of the integrity of evidentiary media: verifying that a
forensic duplicate is a bit-for-bit copy of the original file, and, in partic-
ular, verifying that a forensic duplicate has not been altered during the
chain of custody. This use of cryptographic hashing is critical in judicial
proceedings as it helps preserve a defendant’s right to a fair trial.
While conducting a validation study of digital forensics proficiency
test media we were surprised to find that several commonly used forensic
applications reported diﬀerent hash values for the same CD. Since a hash
value is computed based on the contents of a file, a diﬀerent hash value
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should be obtained only if the file’s contents were modified. Changes in
a file’s metadata, e.g,. date and time stamps, location and name, should
not aﬀect the computed hash value.
To determine the cause of the anomalous results, we formulated a
series of experiments using several variables: CD write options, system
hardware, operating system and CD drive. The experiments involved the
use of four popular forensic applications to calculate MD5 hash values
of several test CDs. Our results suggest that certain write options cause
forensic applications to report diﬀerent hash values. We examine the
possible consequences of these anomalies in legal proceedings and provide
best practices for the use of hashing procedures.
2. Experimental Method
To reduce the number of factors in our experimental design, we chose
variables that were most likely to aﬀect the hash values. These variables
were: (i) CD write options, (ii) system hardware, (iii) operating system,
and (iv) CD drive.
2.1 CD Write Options
Several dozen write attributes are available for writing a CD. The
CD used in our original validation study was created using the k3b
application in Linux. We used default writing methods to write the CD,
which included track-at-once, ISO-9660 + Joliet, and non multi-session.
We employed three common write attributes in our experiments. Each
attribute had two options, resulting in eight distinct experimental cells.
The three attributes, which are described in more detail below, were: (i)
disk-at-once (DAO) versus track-at-once (TAO), (ii) multi-session versus
non multi-session, and (iii) ISO 9660 versus ISO 9660 + Joliet.
2.1.1 Disk Write Method. The track-at-once (TAO) disk
write method, by default, inserts a two-second pause between tracks
during the writing process. It is commonly used to write disks with
multiple tracks or disks with audio and data tracks [12]. The disk-at-
once (DAO) option writes all the tracks on a CD in one pass, allowing
a variable-length pause or no pause between tracks. Unlike TAO, DAO,
by default, does not insert gaps between tracks [12]. DAO is commonly
used when there is no need to insert gaps between tracks or when a gap
that is not two seconds long is needed [12].
2.1.2 Session. The multi-session write option allows multiple
sessions to be written on a disk. A session is a container for the individual
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components that make up the structure of a CD. The session components
comprise a lead-in area, the track(s) containing data, and a lead-out area
[11]. The lead-in area contains the table of contents for the session, which
gives the location of each track in the session (similar to a partition table)
[11]. Tracks are the sequential sectors on the disk itself. The lead-out
area closes the session on the disk [11]. The non multi-session write
option only allows for one session to be opened and closed on a disk.
As with a multi-session disk, the session on a non multi-session disk
contains a lead-in area, data tracks, and a lead-out area.
2.1.3 File System. The ISO 9660 file system, which was de-
veloped for CDs, allows data to be written so that it is accessible by
any operating system [3]. The Joliet extension to the ISO 9660 stan-
dard allows filenames up to 64 characters [10]. (The ISO 9660 standard
restricted filenames to eight characters.)
Table 1. Test systems.
Hardware and Operating System Optimal Drive and Firmware
System 1: Dell Optiplex 260 w/ Samsung SC-148C w/ Firmware B104
Windows 2000 SP4
System 2: Dell Optiplex 620 w/ NEC ND-3550A w/ Firmware 1.05
Windows Server 2003 SP1
System 3: Dell Poweredge 2800 Dual Samsung SN-324S w/ Firmware U304
Booting Windows XP SP2/Linux
2.2 Test Systems
We used three computer systems in our tests, each with a diﬀerent
optical drive in order to determine if diﬀerent hardware configurations
might produce diﬀerent hash values. We also used diﬀerent operating
systems – Windows 2000, Windows XP, Windows 2003 Server and Red-
hat Linux Enterprise Workstation 4 – to establish if they had an eﬀect
on the hash results. The hardware, operating system and optical drive
configurations are presented in Table 1. Since this is not a fully crossed
experimental design, it is not possible to separate the hardware config-
uration and operating system eﬀects.
2.3 Hashing Applications
We selected commonly used forensic applications to hash the test
media. For the Windows systems, the applications included Guidance
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Software’s EnCase 4 and EnCase 5 [5], AccessData’s Forensic Toolkit
(FTK) [1] and X-Ways Forensics [13]. Specifically, EnCase 4.22a, En-
Case 5.05a, FTK Imager 2.2 and X-Ways Forensics 13.0 were installed
on each system (see Table 1). For the Redhat Enterprise Linux 4 appli-
cations, we used the command line utility md5sum 5.2.1, readcd 2.01 and
isoinfo 2.01. We used md5sum to produce the MD5 hash for each disk,
readcd [2] to report the TOC and the last sector used for each disk, and
isoinfo [2] to report and verify that certain write options were in fact
used to create the disk [8].
2.4 CD Test Media
The CD test media used were Imation brand 700MB 52x rated CD-
Recordable disks. The test CD disks were created using Nero Burning
ROM version 6.6.1.4 [6] on an IBM ThinkPad T43 laptop with a Mat-
shita UJDA765 drive, firmware revision 1.02. We selected Nero because
it is a popular CD writing application that is often bundled with OEM
computers and retail optical drives [6].
Each disk had the three test components enabled within the tabs of
the new compilation menu in Nero. Each disk was set to Data Mode
1, ISO Level 1 for filename length, and ISO 9660 for the character set.
Data Mode 1 is a part of the Yellow Book Standard for CD-ROMs; this
mode is traditionally used for disks containing non-audio/video data [9].
Data Mode 2 is traditionally used for disks containing audio or video
data. Mode 1 utilizes EDC and ECC error correction techniques to
ensure data integrity whereas Mode 2 does not [3]. ISO 9660 Level 1
only allows file names with a maximum length of eight characters with
a three character extension and a directory depth of eight levels to be
written to the disk [10]. The ISO 9660 character set is a subset of the
ASCII standard that allows for alpha characters a-z, numbers 0-9 and
the underscore “ ” [10].
The relaxation options, “Allow path depth of more than 8 directories,”
“Allow more than 255 characters in path,” and “Do not add the ‘;1’ ISO
file version extension” were unchecked except for the “Allow more than
64 characters for Joliet names” if an ISO 9660 + Joliet disk was used
[6]. The label was the default automatic with a label of “new” and the
date’s information was also the default [6].
We copied the same executable file to each CD. We expected the
forensic applications to report the same hash value for the same CD.
Because of the diﬀerent write options, timestamps, etc., for each of the
eight test CDs, it made no sense to compare hash values across CD test
conditions as the hash values would be expected to be diﬀerent.
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Table 2. Hash values for Test 1.
Application Hash Value Sectors
EnCase 4 48D3F3AAA43A3AFF516902F0278F849B 1,207
EnCase 5 70E4FA9880726AA8B5BA1E752576CAA9 1,208
FTK 70E4FA9880726AA8B5BA1E752576CAA9 1,208
X-Ways 70E4FA9880726AA8B5BA1E752576CAA9 1,208
md5sum/readcd 70E4FA9880726AA8B5BA1E752576CAA9 1,208
(System 3 Only)
3. Experimental Results
This section presents the results of the eight tests. Note that the
only valid comparison of hash values is within a particular test. This
is because each write option creates diﬀerent information on a disk,
resulting in diﬀerent hash values for the eight test CDs. Only one table
(Table 2) is provided for Tests 1–4 because no variations were observed
across tests and systems.
Tests 1–4 (DAO, Multi-Session, ISO 9660)
Systems 1, 2 and 3 reported the same results for the first test disk (Test
1), with the exception of EnCase 4. The EnCase 4 result is anomalous
in that it detected and scanned one less sector than the other forensic
applications (1,207 sectors instead of 1,208 sectors reported by the other
programs). For System 3, md5sum reported the same hash value as the
Windows applications. isoinfo correctly verified the presence of an ISO
9660 disk with no Joliet support. readcd reported that the last sector
used was 1,208, which correlated with the results for all the Windows
applications except EnCase 4.
Results of Tests 1–4
Due to space constraints and consistent results for Tests 1–4, specific
results for Tests 2–4 are omitted. The results of Tests 2–4 have the same
pattern as those of Test 1, for which EnCase 5, FTK, X-Ways and md5sum
reported the same hash results (within each test). EnCase 4 exhibited
the same behavior for Tests 1–4 in that it reported one less sector than
the other applications and, therefore, produced diﬀerent hash values.
The results indicate that no combination of write options, hardware or
operating systems had an eﬀect on the hash values produced. The only
anomaly was observed for EnCase 4, which undercounted the number
of sectors (n − 1) and always produced a diﬀerent hash value. Further
study indicated this behavior to be consistent for all CDs using the DAO
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condition, which always resulted in a diﬀerent hash value (corresponding
to n− 1 sectors hashed).
Table 3. Hash values for Test 5 (Systems 1 and 2).
Application Hash Value Sectors
EnCase 4 A296A352F2C8060B180FFE6F32DE6392 1,207
EnCase 5 A296A352F2C8060B180FFE6F32DE6392 1,207
FTK 44133FEB352D37BC365EC210DF81D7FD 1,208
X-Ways 050EA9954ADA1977CE58E894E73E0221 1,208
(1 Read Error)
Table 4. Hash values for Test 5 (System 3).
Application Hash Value Sectors
EnCase 4 A296A352F2C8060B180FFE6F32DE6392 1,207
(1 Read Error)
EnCase 5 7A1366AE9CC3A96FD9BF56B9B91A633B 1,206
FTK 44133FEB352D37BC365EC210DF81D7FD 1,208
X-Ways 2211A026EC7F309517050D55CEEE2954 1,208
(2 Read Errors)
md5sum/readcd (I/O Errors; System 3 Only) 1,208
Test 5 (TAO, Multi-Session, ISO 9660)
Test 5 resulted in discrepancies in reported hash values between sys-
tems and applications. Consequently, the results are presented in two
tables (Table 3 for Systems 1 and 2, and Table 4 for System 3). EnCase
4 and 5 produce the same results for Systems 1 and 2. The results for
EnCase 4 were the same for all three systems, even though a read error
was reported for System 3. Note that EnCase 5 reported a diﬀerent hash
and sector count (n−1) for System 3. X-Ways encountered a read error
and reported the same hash value for Systems 1 and 2, but a diﬀerent
value for System 3. X-Ways also reported two read errors for System 3.
Note that md5sum reported an I/O error and would not hash the CD.
FTK reported the same hash value for all three systems; however, this
value was diﬀerent from the hash values reported by the other applica-
tions. isoinfo correctly verified the presence of an ISO 9660 disk with
no Joliet extensions enabled. readcd reported that the last used sector
was 1,208, which correlated with the results obtained with FTK and
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X-Ways. On the other hand, both versions of EnCase reported 1,207
sectors.
Interestingly, EnCase 4 and 5 reported the same hash value for the
test CD with Systems 1 and 2, which is inconsistent with the diﬀerent
results obtained for Tests 1–4. It is not clear why the Test 5 results are
consistent for Systems 1 and 2, but inconsistent for System 3. EnCase
5 reported n − 1 sectors, while FTK, X-Ways and readcd reported n
(1,208) sectors on the same disk. It is not clear why EnCase 5 exhibits
this behavior.
Of special concern to examiners is the fact that not a single consistent
hash value was reported for System 3. In all, five diﬀerent hash values
were reported for the test disk (Test 5). Given the inconsistent results
for System 3, it would not be possible to determine which hash value is
correct if System 3 was the only one used to validate a CD.
Table 5. Hash values for Test 6 (Systems 1 and 2).
Application Hash Value Sectors
EnCase 4 A0B7E6A28FB17DB7AB1F5C0E1ED414C5 1,211
EnCase 5 A0B7E6A28FB17DB7AB1F5C0E1ED414C5 1,211
FTK 2109A7DBCF1B83D357EA0764100672B1 1,212
X-Ways 0006AEA93E620C864530ADF7FC287A61 1,212
(1 Read Error; System 2 Only)
Table 6. Hash values for Test 6 (System 3).
Application Hash Value Sectors
EnCase 4 A0B7E6A28FB17DB7AB1F5C0E1ED414C5 1,211
(1 Read Error)
EnCase 5 CE37E507FCCFFF857B2BB79F3E57483B 1,210
FTK 2109A7DBCF1B83D357EA0764100672B1 1,212
X-Ways B703C2E0D42E301ECA71F1C3C1BF6C71 1,212
(2 Read Errors)
md5sum/readcd I/O Error; System 3 Only) 1,212
Test 6 (TAO, Multi-Session, ISO 9660 + Joliet)
The Test 6 results (Tables 5 and 6) had similar discrepancies as those
for Test 5. EnCase 4 and 5 reported the same hash values for Systems 1
and 2. EnCase 4 provided consistent hash values for all three systems,
but produced a read error for System 1 (similar to Test 5 above). X-
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Ways reported read errors for Systems 1 and 2. For System 3, as in the
case of Test 5, the forensic applications produced five diﬀerent hash val-
ues. Note that FTK reported the same hash value for all three systems;
however, this value was diﬀerent from the hash values reported by the
other applications. Once again, md5sum reported an I/O error and did
not produce a hash value. isoinfo verified an ISO 9660 disk with Joliet
extensions enabled. readcd reported that the last sector used was sector
1,212, which correlated with the results for FTK and X-Ways as in Test
5.
Table 7. Hash values for Test 7 (Systems 1 and 2).
Application Hash Value Sectors
EnCase 4 897BA35435EE6183B03B7745E4FFCDC0 1,206
EnCase 5 897BA35435EE6183B03B7745E4FFCDC0 1,206
FTK 978F6D133EE22C7C8B692C1A43EFE795 1,207
X-Ways BAFF87CEF354BF880D4AD8919A25CB6E 1,207
Table 8. Hash values for Test 7 (System 3).
Application Hash Value Sectors
EnCase 4 897BA35435EE6183B03B7745E4FFCDC0 1,206
(1 Read Error)
EnCase 5 986F1E56D89476ABC8F69958C551A42D 1,205
FTK 978F6D133EE22C7C8B692C1A43EFE795 1,207
X-Ways 664C56F4A3F450A8FD1B1D37C526F47A 1,207
(2 Read Errors)
md5sum/readcd (I/O Error; System 3 Only) 1,207
Test 7 (TAO, Non Multi-Session, ISO 9660)
The pattern of results for Test 7 (Tables 7 and 8) is similar to those
for Tests 5 and 6. EnCase 4 and 5 reported the same hash value for
Systems 1 and 2. EnCase 4 reported consistent hash values for all three
systems, although it again reported a read error for System 3. X-Ways
reported read errors for System 3 only. FTK reported consistent hashes
for all three systems, as did EnCase 4. Five diﬀerent hash values were
reported for System 3. Once again, md5sum reported an I/O error and
did not produce a hash value. readcd reported a sector count of 1,207,
which correlated with the results for FTK and X-Ways. isoinfo verified
the presence of an ISO 9660 disk with no Joliet extensions enabled.
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Table 9. Hash values for Test 8 (Systems 1 and 2).
Application Hash Value Sectors
EnCase 4 284EF959A864DACF83206C1AA1A0B4CB 1,210
EnCase 5 284EF959A864DACF83206C1AA1A0B4CB 1,210
FTK 7F49A83724130E46974CD24097C01F3A 1,211
X-Ways 41BD02ED23DF42190F06CACC97275D30 1,211
Table 10. Hash values for Test 8 (System 3).
Application Hash Value Sectors
EnCase 4 284EF959A864DACF83206C1AA1A0B4CB 1,210
(1 Read Error)
EnCase 5 378D6B62CCB8A81CC5001569AEF1A3D4 1,209
FTK 7F49A83724130E46974CD24097C01F3A 1,211
X-Ways 910962B3A2561FCDB8382B14B9FDDA8B 1,211
(2 Read Errors)
md5sum/readcd (I/O Error; System 3 Only) 1,211
Test 8 (TAO, Non Multi-Session, ISO 9660 + Joliet)
The Test 8 results (Tables 9 and 10) are similar to those for Tests
5–7. For Systems 1 and 2, EnCase 4 and 5 produced matching hash
values, albeit with one read error for EnCase 4 with System 3. FTK
reported consistent hash values for all three systems, but this value was
inconsistent with the hash values reported by the other forensic applica-
tions. X-Ways produced matching hash values for Systems 1 and 2, but
not for System 3. None of the X-Ways hash values matched the values
obtained with the other applications. Once again, md5sum reported an
I/O error and did not produce a hash value. readcd reported a sector
count of 1,211 that again correlated with the results obtained with FTK
and X-Ways. isoinfo verified the presence of an ISO 9660 disk with
Joliet extensions enabled.
Results of Tests 5–8
The results for Test 5–8 are inconsistent with those obtained for Tests
1–4. The following anomalous patterns are consistently observed for
Tests 5–8.
1. EnCase 4 and 5 produced the same hash value for Systems 1 and 2. However,
the number of sectors read was one less than reported by the other Windows
applications.
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2. EnCase 4 reported the same hash value for Systems 1, 2 and 3, and produced
a read error for all tests on System 3.
3. EnCase 4 and 5 reported diﬀerent hash values for System 3.
4. EnCase 5 reported the same hash value for Systems 1 and 2, and a diﬀerent
hash value for System 3.
5. FTK reported the same hash value for Systems 1, 2 and 3. However, the hash
value was diﬀerent from the values reported by the other applications.
6. X-Ways reported the same hash value for Systems 1 and 2.
7. X-Ways produced read errors for all tests on Systems 1, 2 and 3.
8. md5sum failed to produce a hash value, always reporting an I/O error.
9. For Systems 1 and 2, the sector count pattern was always n−1 for both EnCase
4 and 5, and n sectors for FTK and X-Ways.
10. For System 3, the sector count pattern was always n − 1 for EnCase 4, n− 2
sectors for EnCase 5, and n sectors for FTK and X-Ways.
In light of these results it is clear that at least some write options
and hardware/operating system combinations aﬀected the hash values
(especially when the TAO write option was used). In Tests 5–8 for Sys-
tem 3, there were never less than five distinct hash values although two
applications (FTK and X-Ways) always reported the same sector count.
This is more than likely related to the read errors that X-Ways encoun-
tered with most TAO disks used in our experiments. The results should
also be cause for concern for examiners who use the forensic applications
to hash evidentiary CDs with the aforementioned write options.
It appears that that the write method used (TAO versus DAO) is
the primary factor in producing the anomalous results. The results of
Tests 1–4, which used DAO, produced the same hash value regardless
of session type or file system used. The anomalous results obtained in
Tests 5–8 suggest that the TAO write method aﬀects the computed hash
values.
4. Results for a Bad Drive
During our initial testing we found that System 2 configured with a
HL-DT-ST GWA4164B drive (firmware version D108) was “bad.” The
drive was very erratic at reading disks during Tests 1–7; by Test 8, the
drive would not read the disk at all. We confirmed that the drive was
bad by comparing the hash values obtained in the eight tests with the
results obtained when a new drive was installed in System 2; also, we
examined the hash values obtained in the eight tests for Systems 1 and
3. We addressed the issue by replacing the bad drive with an NEC ND-
3550A drive (firmware version 1.05) to create a new System 2, which
was used for Tests 1–8 described above.
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Table 11. Test 1 with Bad Drive (System 2).
Application Hash Value
EnCase4 25E52C25C5841A7415F65301121DF986
EnCase5 A00EF2AD9822461DAC328C743D45638C
FTK 70E4FA9880726AA8B5BA1E752576CAA9
X-Ways A00EF2AD9822461DAC328C743D45638C
Table 12. Test 1 with Good Drive (System 2).
Application Hash Value
EnCase4 48D3F3AAA43A3AFF516902F0278F849B
EnCase5 70E4FA9880726AA8B5BA1E752576CAA9
FTK 70E4FA9880726AA8B5BA1E752576CAA9
X-Ways 70E4FA9880726AA8B5BA1E752576CAA9
Table 11 helps illustrate the eﬀects of a bad drive on the reported
hash values (Test 1 with System 2). There are some interesting consis-
tencies in the reported hash values for the bad drive (Table 11). For
example, EnCase 5 and X-Ways reported the same hash value; however,
this value is inconsistent with the other hash values. Another interesting
observation is that the hash value reported by FTK was the same for
the bad drive (Table 11) and the good drive (Table 12).
The sector counts reported by the bad drive for all the disks in the
experiment had the same patterns. EnCase 4 reported n-3 sectors, En-
Case 5 n-2 sectors, FTK n sectors, and X-Ways n-2 sectors. The sector
count reported by FTK correlates with FTK’s results for all three good
drives, which might explain why they all produce the same hash values.
5. Discussion
Our experimental results demonstrate clear trends in the factors af-
fecting the values computed for CDs, especially between the DAO and
TAO writing methods. CDs written with the DAO option produced
consistent hash values. On the other hand, CDs written under the TAO
option produced anomalous results, including inconsistent hash values
and sector counts across forensic applications, read errors for certain
forensic applications, and inconsistent hash values across hardware con-
figurations and operating systems.
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The results obtained in the case of the “bad drive” underscore the im-
portance of verifying that an optical drive or media reader – especially
one used in a digital forensics investigation – reports accurate data. This
is challenging because there is usually no means of calibrating such a de-
vice after it leaves the manufacturing facility. Consequently, we recom-
mend that examiners triangulate hash results across other drives and/or
systems. If the time and/or systems are unavailable to triangulate the
results, then a comparison of the hash value computed by the untested
system with the hash value of a known verified and “triangulated” disk
could be used to show that the results reported by a particular drive are
accurate.
6. Conclusions
Cryptographic hashing is crucial to verifying the integrity of digital ev-
idence. Given the results obtained for the TAO disk writing option, the
potential exists that the integrity of digital evidence could be challenged
on the grounds that the hash value calculated by a defense expert does
not match the value presented by the prosecution. Such a challenge, if
successful, would almost certainly aﬀect the outcome of the case. How-
ever, the fact that diﬀerent hardware/software combinations produce
diﬀerent hash values for an item of digital evidence does not mean that
cryptographic hashing cannot be relied on to verify the integrity of ev-
idence. As long the entire hashing process can be duplicated and the
results shown to match, there should be no problems in using hash values
to verify the integrity of the evidence. Therefore, it is crucial that exam-
iners maintain detailed documentation about the specific hardware and
operating system configurations, optical drives and firmware revisions,
and the forensic applications used to produce hash values of evidentiary
items.
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